Macmurray’s primary criticism of the Western philosophical tradition is that it begins from a theoretical, rather from than a practical, standpoint. In The Self as Agent, he critiques and corrects Descartes’ ‘I think’ with the ‘I do’, a construction of the Self existing first and foremost as an agent of action in the world. In chapter 1, ‘The Crisis of the Personal’, he expresses his concern that philosophy’s emphasis on objectivity necessarily results in an atheistic approach.

Persons in Relation presupposes the conclusions of The Self as Agent to complete Macmurray’s analysis of the form of the personal by establishing the Self as an agent constituted by his relationship to the Other, that is, by mutual relationships with other persons. Macmurray argues that an isolated agent is a self-contradiction because agency requires relationship with the Other as resistance and support to his actions in order to be able to do anything (i.e., in order to be an agent).